California HSR should use Tejon Pass

The current California HSR plan has significant flaws; a major mistake was selecting a detour via Palmdale instead of the direct route via I-5 across Tejon pass to connect Bakersfield to Los Angeles. The cost of the Palmdale route -- about $32 billion in current dollars -- is more than twice that of the direct link, and nobody wants to pay for it. The HSR project will be restricted to the Central Valley until the less expensive Tejon route is embraced.

Sunday, October 11, 2020

Cost overrun on Central Valley Segment?

The California HSR Project is facing a $1 billion cost overun on the Central Valley Segment (119 miles, Madera-to-Shafter), according to an article by Ralph Vartabedianin in the Los Angeles Times on Sept. 8, 2020. CHSR Authority financial reports provide limited information (see Table 1 below), and therefore provide little insight into the fraction of the project that has actually been constructed. Some 57% of the budgeted amount for the three design-build contracts had been expended by the end of July 2020, with no clue whether the project is actually within budget.

A more helpful source for gauging progress is the "Central Valley Status Report" which tracks how many structures and miles of guideway have been started, and how many completed, as summarized in Table 2 below. Counting projects underway as half complete on average, then guideway is 42% compete but structures are only 27% complete for the three constructions projects combined. This is discouraging: construction of the CVS is only one-third finished with less than 30 months before the December 2022 deadline. A cost overrun of $1 billion is likely, as Vartabedian indicates is his article in the Los Angeles Times. The CVS project has been beset by cost increases ("change orders") and delays involving substantial penalties.

Assuming that 80% of the Design-Build contracts, or $3.9 billion, is for actual construction, and two-thirds of that amount, or $2.6 billion, will be spent on the uncompleted projects, then the total expended on Design-Bulid will come to $5.4 billion, or about $500 million over budget. This is just a bit more than the $400 million paid to Tutor-Perini in delay penalties on CP-1 that Vartabedian reported, but this is not the only cost overrun he mentions. On the other hand, some projects have been completed within budget, such as the relocation of SR-99 in Fresno (not part of CP-1).

CP-1 (Madera to just south of Fresno) is particlarly complex, and the construction package most likely to incur a significant cost overrun. The section north of the San Joaquin River is well on the way to completion in the next two years, with six structures completed and construction on the remaining three overpasses now underway. The San Joaquin bridge is nearing completion, along with the viaduct and pergola over the UPRR tracks south of the bridge. The trench under SR 186 and the Cedar-Muscat viaduct are both in an advanced state of construction, and three overpasses (Ashlan Ave., Stanislaus St., and Tuolumne St.) are complete or nearly so. but construction has not even begun on at least three overcrossings and two undercrossings. Finally, relocation of four miles of Golden State Blvd. has just begun. By the HSR Authority's own count, construction is yet to start on 16 structures included in CP-1.

References

Table 1. Expenditures in the Central Valley as of July 31, 2020

Real Property Design-build
(Billion $)BudgetedExpendedPercentBudgetedExpendedPercent
CP1$0.817$0.74390.9%$2.250$1.27356.6%
CP2-3$0.534$0.37169.5%$2.035$1.14956.5%
CP4$0.184$0.14478.3%$0.594$0.35659.9%
Totals$1.535$1.25882.0%$4.879$2.77856.9%

Table 2. Progress on Construction in the Central Valley as of July 31, 2020

TotalAcquired, CompleteUnder WayRemain-ingPercent Complete
Right of Way (parcels)
CP11072832---24077.6%
CP2-31011645---36663.8%
CP4239163---7668.2%
Totals23221640---68270.6%
Structures (number)
CP1337101636.4%
CP2-3490202920.4%
CP41107431.8%
Totals937375127.4%
Guideway (miles)
CP1322111923.4%
CP2-36519262049.2%
CP421019.81.247.1%
Totals1182156.840.241.9%

Saturday, August 15, 2020

Why no public-private partnership for CA HSR?

Proposition 1A , the "Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century," was approved by California voters in November 2008. A major selling point was the prospect of attracting outside funding from the federal government and private investors, leveraged by a state contribution of $9 billion in bond sales authorized by the measure. Thus far, this hasn't worked out very well; the current construction project in the Central Valley from Madera to Shafter is projected to cost $11.7 billion, of which only $2.1 B (17%) comes from a federal ARRA grant. The rest of the funding is entirely from state sources: $2.6 B (23%) from Prop. 1A bonds and about $7 B (60%) from Greenhouse Gas Cap & Trade revenue. The federal contribution is disappointing, and there's no private partner.

Why so little interest by potential partners in the California HSR Project? It's mainly because the CHSR Authority is committed to an exorbitantly expensive route connecting Los Angeles and Bakersfield via Palmdale which requires 40 miles of tunneling. In its 2005 programmic EIR, the CHSRA claimed that this route would need only 13 miles, compared to 23 miles of tunneling for the alternative, direct route across Tejon pass (I-5). The Authority selected the Palmdale route as the "Preferred Alternative" for two reasons; its estimated cost was slightly less than the direct I-5 route, but the decisive factor for the CHSRA was potential development in the Antelope valley served by a Palmdale station.

Los Angeles anchors the California HSR Project, and a connection to northern California across the Tehachapi mountains is essential to generate an acceptable level of ridership and revenue for the project. But the link via Palmdale is far too expensive to attract outside funding; its cost is now well over $30 billion, more than twice the estimated cost in the 2005 EIR ($14 B, after adjusting for inflation). No one is willing to buy into this exorbitantly expensive venture. The obvious alternative is the direct route across Tejon pass, which was considered in the 2005 EIR but set aside in favor of the longer alignment. If the CHSR Authority honestly wants a public-private partnership, the selection of the Preferred Alternative has to be reconsidered: the only serious proposals from potential partners will involve the direct link across Tejon pass.

Sunday, August 9, 2020

Currennt Financial Position for California HSR

Note: Financial data presented here (Tables 1-3) are drawn mainly from financial reports to the CHSR Finance & Audit Committee at its July 2020 meeting (scheduled but then canceled).

The California HSR project currently has enough money in the bank and in the pipeline from expected Prop 1A bond sales and Cap & Trade auctions that it isn't going to have a cash flow problem for at least five years. Its immediate problem is a slow pace of construction which is inadequate to meet established completion dates, particularly the Dec. 31, 2022, deadline for satisfying the federal funding agreement for completing the Central Valley Segment (Madera to Shafter). Work on thus segment has been underway for some five years, but it is only half completed with $5.2 billion expended so far and $6.5 B remaining in the budget (see Table 1). The current pace of construction is about $1 B per year (Table 2), so it is unrealistic to expect completion of the CVS before the end of 2025.

Current work on the CHSR Project includes construction of the CVS, a modest amount of work on the "bookends" (improvements to Caltrain and run-through tracks at LAUS), and completion of a full set of project-level EIRs for the entire Phase I, from San Francisco to Anaheim. CHSRA estimates the total cost of the current program at $14.7 B (Table 1), but adds "Other Costs" to reach a total of $15.6 B in the 2020 Draft Business Plan (Exhibit 3.4, p. 66). Some $6.7 B had been spent by May 31, 2020, according to the accounting in Table 1. About $8 B is budgeted to complete the current program, with a nominal completion date by the end of 2022 as specified by the federal Grant Agreement, but this deadline will not be met. CHSRA has only $2.6 B cash in hand (Table 3) with about $1.9 B expected from Cap & Trade, leaving it some $2.5 B short.

In 2019 Gov. Newsom set a specific goal for CHSR, to complete the entire CVS from Merced to Bakersfield (170 miles) before starting work on the Pachaco pass route to Gilroy and San Jose. The estimated cost for the entire CVS is $20.4 B (Business Plan, Exhibit 3.4), or $4.8 on top of the $8 B needed to complete the first 119 miles for a total remaining outlay of nearly $13 B to finish the entire CVS, from Merced to Bakersfield. Authorized funding throuh tht end of 2030 includes $2.6 B in the bank plus 10.5 years of Cap & Trade revenue at about $750 M per year, or $7.9 B, for a total of some $10.5 B. There is a $2.5 B shortfall, barring unexpected additional support.

What's the future for HSR in California?

The obvious short term goal is to complete the CVS (119 miles) without electrification, to fulfill the federal agreement; this would reduce travel time for the existing San Joaquin service by one-hour. The CHSRA appears committed to the North Initial Operational Segment (IOS), alias "Valley-to-Valley", from Bakersfield to San Jose, but this will require a major infusion of state funding which the legislature is unlikely to approve. The Early Train Operator (ETO) proposed completing the entire CVS (170 miles) including electrification, with diesel-powered feeder service from the north connecting to HSR at Merced. This would require an investment of some $10 B in additional funding in the San Joaquin and Altamont Corridor Express (ACE), including major improvement to Altamont Pass, to make it effective. IOS North is even more expensive, reqiring another $16 B in addition to the entire CVS.

The question of how to effectively use a stand-alone CVS -- either 119 or 170 miles -- is tied into the larger issue of the role HSR should play in expanding intercity rail service in California. The present State Rail Plan (2018) was prepared under the auspices of the previous Governor who was thoroughly committed to the current HSR Project, which depreciated the value of the existing corridors ("Amtrak California") and deferred major improvements to them until HSR Phase 1 was completed. Discussion of a better balanced plan will be covered in a subsequent post on this blog.

Table 1. Expended and Available Funds for California HSR

Author-ized Appropri-ated Program Budger Expended To Date Percent Expended
Project Development
Bond Fund (Prop 1A) $0.900 $0.575 $0.575 $0.494 86%
Cap and Trade $0.678 $0.678 $0.618 $0.160 26%
Federal Trust Fund (ARRA) $0.511 $0.511 $0.487 $0.487 100%
Subtotal, Project Develop. $2.089 $1.764 $1.681 $1.142 68%
Construction
Bond Fund (Prop 1A) $7.000 $2.609 $2.609 $2.4774 95%
Cap and Trade $10.498 $10.498 $7.037 $0.699 10%
Federal Trust Fund (ARRA) $2.1141 $2.114 $2.060 $2.060 100%
Subtotal, Construction $19.612 $15.221 $11.705 $5.235 45%
Bookend Projects (Local Assistance)
Bond Fund (Prop 1A) $1.100 $1.100 $1.100 $0.153 14%
Cap and Trade $0.198 $0.198 $0.198 $0.168 85%
Subtotal, Bookend Projects $1.2981 $1.298 $1.298 $0.320 25%
Subtotals by source of support
Bond Fund (Prop 1A) $9.000 $4.284 $4.284 $3.124 73%
Cap and Trade $11.374 $11.374 $7.853 $1.027 13%
Federal Trust Fund (ARRA) $2.625 $2.625 $2.547 $2.547 100%
TOTAL $22.999 $18.283 $14.684 $6.700 46%

Table 2. Cumulative Program Totals for California HSR

Total to 6/30 2014 FY 14-15 FY 15-16 FY 16-17 FY 17-18 FY 18-19 FY 19-20 Total to 6/30 2020
California Financial Support
Prop 1A $400 $45 $56 $1,323 $800 $600 $390 $3,614
Cap & Trade --- $650 $459 $221 $708 $787 $489 $3,313
Expenses by Category
Administrative $103 $17 $21 $22 $19 $21 $26 $229
Project Delivery $11 $8 $11 $13 $16 $17 $19 $94
Local Assist. --- --- --- --- $0 $92 $99 $191
Proj. Develop. $498 $46 $134 $179 $145 $86 $84 $1,171
Construction $227 $430 $879 $922 $1,016 $765 $1,400 $5,639
TOTAL $838 $501 $1,044 $1,135 $1,197 $981 $1,628 $7,325

Table 3. California Financial Support for HSR

Prop 1A Bond Fund Cap & Trade
Revenue $3,614 $3,313
Expenditures $3.124 $1.027
Difference, Revenue minus Expenditures $490 $2,286
Cash Balance, May 30, 2020 $288 $2,383

References

Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Federal ARRA award to CHSR in 2010

The California High Speed Rail (CHSR) project was initiated in November 2008 with the approval of Proposition 1A by a majority of 52,6% of the yes-no vote on the measure (7.6% of the ballots were blank or invalid, so the yes vote was only 48.6% of all votes cast). The stated intent of Prop 1A was "to initiate the construction of a high-speed train system that connects the San Francisco Transbay Terminal to Los Angeles Union Station and Anaheim, and links the state’s major population centers," authorizing $9 billion in state bonds for HSR and $950 million for supporting, conventional rail service. $8.1 B was specifically reserved for HSR construction, and was clearly intended to leverage outside support for a initial project some three or four times larger. Additional state support is not authorized by Prop. 1A, but it is not ruled out either.

Barack Obama was elected U.S. President in November 2008, and in February 2009 Congress passed and Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) which included $8 B for infrastructure improvements to intercity rail with priority for HSR projects. On Qctober 1, 2009, the CHSR Authority submitted six application for federal funding under this program, two for planning and four for ifrastructure projects:

  • NEPA/CEQA for Phase 2: Merced-Sacramento & L.A.-San Diego ... $60.0 million
  • NEPA/CEQA for Altamont Corridor ... $22.5 M
  • Complete design and construction of 50-mile segment, San Francisco-San Jose ... $980.0 M
  • Complete design and construction of 50-mile segment, Merced-Fresno ... $466.0 M
  • Complete design and construction of 98-mile segment, Fresno-Bakersfield ... $819.5 M
  • Complete design and construction of of 30-mile segment, L.A.-Anaheim ... $2,187.5 M
CHSRA offered an equal (50%) match for each of these projects. The total request was for $4,535.5 M, over half of the available funds for the HSIPR program. "On January 28, 2010, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) announced the selection of CHSRA to receive up to $2.25 billion in ARRA funds for environmental clearance and supporting preliminary engineering for Phase 1 and funding for certain CHSRA design-build Project Sections." The amount was subsequently increased to $2.55 B when other states declined their awards, with the Authority committing a minimum match of $2.51 B, and further augmented by a supplemental "2010" award of $929 M, with a match of $360 M. CHSRA proposed to draw all of the local match ($2.87 B) from Prop. 1A bonds.

The Grant Agreement for the initial ARRA award for $2.47 B was signed in December 2010 (increased to $2.55 B in August 2011), and the agreement for the "2010" award for $929 M was signed in November 2011. In the meantime, there were extensive negotiations about the scope of the work, complicated by a growing realization that CHSRA had woefully underestimated construction costs in its 2005 program-level EIR which the application was based on. It was in the interest of both CHSRA and USDOT to build the longest possible segment, and they settled on Madera-Shafter, some 119 miles, pegged at a cost of $5.8 B with CHSRA absorbing any additional costs. USDOT recognized that full HSR operations on this segment were not feasible until connected to a larger system, so non-electric San Joaquin service on the CVS was accepted as a satisfactory interim alternative. With construction of this segment now half complete, the cost is currently estimated at $12.4 B, relying on an additional state contribution of some $7 B from Greenhouse Gas Cap & Trade revenues.

Completion date for the ARRA award was originally Sept. 30, 2017, later extended to Dec. 31, 2022, although the federal grant still had to be spent before the first date. Completion date for the "2010" award was originally Dec. 31, 2018, later also extended to Dec. 31, 2022. USDOT allowed CHSRA to spend ARRA funds in advance of the local match, unusual for a grant of this nature, but this leniency was not extended to the "2010" award. In May 2019 none of this grant had yet been spent, and the Trump administration formally withdrew the award.

References