From: John Deeter, Chair of the Transportation, Air Quality & Climate Change Committee, Environmental Council of Sacramento (Affiliation supplied for identification only)
Contact information: 916-952-1268 / jdeeter@gmail.com
To: California High Speed Rail Authority
Date: May 3, 2018
RE Draft 2018 Business Plan
The cost of the California High Speed Rail (HSR) project has grown far beyond what was expected when it was launched with the passage of Proposition 1A in 2008. The projected completion date of 2033 for Phase 1 of a high speed line from San Jose to Burbank with blended running at either end to extend service to Anaheim and San Francisco is not realistic: the HSR Authority itself admits that it has not identified a source for half of the funds needed to accomplish this goal. It is now time to look for ways to rescope this project to make it less expensive, and to provide superior train service to more of the state more expeditiously.
What makes the current HSR plan exorbitantly expensive is the extensive tunneling -- near forty miles -- to maintain a high speed alignment in the mountain sections from Burbank to Bakersfield via Palmdale and from the Central Valley to Gilroy via Pacheco Pass. What is proposed here is to reduce the mountain sections to the absolute minimum for Phase 1, which means changing the route between Los Angeles and Bakersfield to an alignment via Tejon Pass, and deferring the Pacheco Pass connection for the time being. Initially, HSR would be restricted to the Central Valley (CV) from Merced to Bakersfield, along with a new rail connection via Tejon pass, and serving the major urban centers with blended operations on regional rail systems north of Merced and south of San Fernando.
These points will be discussed in more detail below:
- Curtailment of the Initial Operating Segment (IOS) to just the CV segment, from Merced to Bakersfield.
- Major investment in the regional rail network in northern California, to provide feeder train services from Sacramento and the Bay Area to join the HSR segment at Merced, ideally using through trains switching between electric and diesel power at Merced.
- Relocation of the Tehachapi crossing from the extravagantly expensive route via Palmdale to the direct route across Tejon pass .
- Investment in other high ridership corridors, including the Pacific Surfliners, the Capitol Corridor and a new corridor from Los Angeles to the Coachella Valley, along with additional, modest investments in high speed rail.
1. Initial Operating Segment
The immediate focus should be on completing the Central Valley (CV) segment, all the way from Merced to Bakersfield. This project should include electrification to provide a full demonstration of the benefits of high speed rail to the people of the state at the least possible cost. The cost of this segment is about $15 billion -- or perhaps a little more with electrification -- which is fully within the state's financial capabilities. However, the IOS needs to satisfy certain conditions to unlock Prop. 1A bond money: primarily, that it attract enough riders to cover operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, and that the Prop. 1A bonds pay for less than half of the capital costs. High ridership on the CV segment can be achieved with robust feeder services from the Bay Area via a greatly improved Altamont corridor and from Sacramento using existing tracks with more modest improvements (see below). Prop. 1A bonds would provide about $7 billion for this IOS, setting aside $1 B already allocated for the bookends (San Jose-San Francisco and Burbank-Anaheim). Over $4 B of non-bond money has been spent already, so only another $4 B or $5 B from other sources would be needed to complete the IOS.
2. Feeder Service for the Initial Operating Segment
To make the Central Valley IOS effective would require feeder services from Sacramento and the Bay Area, ideally using through trains switching between electric and diesel power at Merced. This scheme would necessitate substantial improvements to the existing alignment, particularly across Altamont Pass and through Niles Canyon. These improvements would cost an additional $5 B or so. but this is only 35% of the cost for extending the Central Valley segment to San Francisco to complete the currently planned "Valley-to-Valley" IOS.
Moreover, an improved route across Altamont Pass would provide a critical link in regional rail service in northern California in addition to providing feeder service to HSR. This route is the natural gateway between the Bay Area and the northern San Joaquin Valley (SJV), and some improvements are already being planned by the San Joaquin RRC. Travel in this market is nearly four times that between the Bay Area and the southern valley (see Exhibit 1.5 on page 16 in the Draft 2018 State Rail Plan). The direct route to the Central Valley via Altamont Pass would provide critical rail service in this corridor, and relatively inexpensive improvements to it deserve much higher priority than the proposed HSR link to the southern CV via Pacheco pass.
The Sacramento branch of the feeder service should be able support at least ten round trips per day, and the branch to the Bay Area even more since there are three possible termini (San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose). The total ridership might exceed 15 thousand per day (nearly five million per year). The high speed portion of this service (Merced to Bakersfield) would certainly generate an operating surplus -- perhaps the entire operation would generate a surplus as well. If diesel operations north of Merced were also converted to electric power, northern California would acquire a modern (electric) regional passenger railroad system spanning over two hundred miles of service in addition to the electric high speed segment south of Merced.
3. Rail Link from Southern California to the Central Valley via Tejon Pass
Along with finishing the Central Valley segment as a demonstration project, the entire HSR project should be reconsidered, including rerouting the alignment to avoid as much as possible the rugged mountainous terrain that entails inordinately expensive tunneling. The 2005 EIR estimated that only about 20 miles of double track tunneling for Phase 1 (Los Angeles to San Francisco) would be needed, but this has expanded to about 45 miles in the latest engineering studies. The key to reducing project costs lies first and foremost in reducing tunneling to the absolute minimum necessary to connect major markets.
The largest saving is obtained by relocating the Tehachapi crossing from the expensive route via Palmdale to the more sensible, direct route across Tejon pass. The principal reasons given in the 2005 EIR for choosing Palmdale over Tejon Pass (pp. 6A 17-19) now support the opposite conclusion: Tejon Pass requires less tunneling and would therefore be much less expensive. Indeed, a critical point was ignored in the EIR that should have dictated this choice: the Tejon route is about 30 miles shorter than the Palmdale alternative, with a corresponding reduction in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. The extra O&M cost for the longer route via Palmdale is an additional, recurring expense on top of the extra capital cost for this segment.
The costs given in the 2005 EIR for the two alternatives connecting Los Angeles and Bakersfield were almost identical -- $8.6 billion in 2003 dollars, or $13 B in current (2017) dollars. A reevaluation of Tejon Pass might increase the cost a bit, but certainly not so much as to rival that for the Palmdale route, now estimated at $26.6 billion (2017 dollars) -- twice the original estimate even after adjusting for inflation. The difference between costs for the two routes is how much it costs to put Palmdale on the main HSR line, and is an unjustified expenditure considering that the Antelope Valley is hardly a secondary market let alone a major urban center. Moreover, the bulk of the some six million annual Palmdale riders would be mainly commuters into the Los Angeles basin and these could be accommodated by improving the existing Metrolink line.
The lower cost of the route via Tejon pass yields a much higher return on investment (ROI) than the longer and more expensive Palmdale route, so it is bound to attract stronger interest from potential partners -- such as national rail agencies -- who could provide technical expertise as well as financial assistance for this difficult mountain crossing. Indeed, a partner with experience in mountain railways might recommend less tunneling for the Tejon Pass route (estimated at 23 miles in the 2005 EIR), by choosing a more aggressive profile for the very steep grade at Grapevine (6% for I-5 with no tunnels).
4. Major Investments in Other High Ridership Rail Corridors
According to the Draft 2018 State Rail Plan, much of future rail ridership in the state will come from regional services, measured not only by the number of riders but also by total distance traveled (passenger miles). In particular, the regional rail network in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (Metrolink) is expected to play an essential role in providing mobility across this 120-mile wide region. Rail trips on regional services are generally less than 100 miles, and even the corridor services (Pacific Surfliner, Capitol Corridor and the emerging corridors on the Central Coast and from Los Angeles to the Coachilla Valley) are dominated by short trips less than 200 miles. The State Rail Plan estimates that rail ridership in 2040 might total about 400 million trips per year (1.3 million per day) of which 40 million (ten percent) will use HSR and only 10 million (2.5 percent) will travel 200 miles or more by rail. HSR has its place in the overall rail plan but other services are collectively more important.
The Draft State Rail Plan presents a scheme for improvements to the California passenger rail network through the year 2040 along with associated cost estimates, arriving at a total sum of some $132 billion or $6 B per year. There is some overlap between HSR and other projects, but at least $70 B can be attributed to HSR (including an interstate link to Las Vegas), leaving around $60 B for other rail projects. But most of the non-HSR projects get deferred until completion of HSR Phase 1, which won't happen until 2035 and probably much later than that.
Focusing the rail program in the near term strongly on HSR drastically impedes investment in other rail markets, and particularly the corridor services -- Pacific Surfliner, Capitol Corridor and San Joaquins -- that the state is directly responsible for. Reducing the cost of HSR would allow a much better balance in funding among the various rail services in the state, putting the corridor services on a more equitable footing as HSR
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In 1990 California had a sensible plan to link north and south ("Los Angeles-Fresno-Bay Area-Sacramento High Speed Rail Corridor Study Draft Final Report"), but over the next 15 years this plan was hijacked by political and parochial interests to ensure that very specific markets would be given priority, even over the critical north-south spine. Returning to the spirit of the 1990 plan would entail a thorough reconsideration of the plan outlined in the 2005 and 2012 EIRs, and encapsulated as Proposition 1A approved by the voters in 2008.
The California HSR project should be drastically rescoped to reduce costs in order to build an affordable Phase 1 system within a ten-year time frame. To do this would require eliminating two-thirds of the expensive construction in rugged terrain, thereby saving some $24 billion. Operations at the highest speeds (200 mph) would initially be restricted to the Central Valley segment from Merced to Grapevine. The Tehachapi crossing would be moved to Tejon Pass, and HSR trains would operate on tracks shared with regional services north of Merced and south of San Fernando. The markets that would be lost in this scheme are direct services between Palmdale and Bakersfield and between San Jose and Fresno, and fast service between Burbank and Palmdale, but these are relatively minor markets and their loss would barely affect intercity ridership. Travel time for the longest markets would see a modest increase compared to Phase 1 as currently proposed -- Los Angeles-San Francisco, for instance, would rise from 3.5 hours to about four.
The result is a Phase 1 system (Anaheim-San Francisco) considerably different than that envisioned by Prop. 1A. But that measure provided only limited funding for HSR, and Article 2 acknowledges that the intent of Prop. 1A is to initiate construction of a high speed rail system without specifying precisely how to complete it. What Prop. 1A does require is a fully funded IOS to release Prop. 1A bond money, and only suggests how that might lead to a Phase 1 system. This is just as well, since the cost of the project has now ballooned to twice that contemplated when Prop. 1A was approved, even after adjusting for inflation. The strategy proposed here is intended to get the costs of the entire state rail program under control, starting with downsizing the high speed portion to a level the state will be able to finance.
It is true that the state would effectively be reneging on the promise of "high speed rail for everyone," but that was never financially feasible and was made only to obtain the support of outlying markets such as Sacramento, and to satisfy the interests of developers in the Antelope and Central Valleys. What is offered here is "high speed rail only where it really makes sense," very possibly limited to just the Central Valley where it is least expensive. Outlying areas would still get high speed trains, but at reduced speed away from the spine in the CV. In this way, project costs are kept under control, and a surprisingly large HSR system can be completed within a relatively short time frame.
6. References
"Los Angeles-Fresno-Bay Area-Sacramento High Speed Rail Corridor Study Draft Final Report," March 1990. Oversight provided by an ad-hoc study group (mainly politicians), with Parsons Brinkerhoff as the primary consultant.
"High speed ground transportation for America." U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, 1997.
"California High-Speed Rail Program EIR/EIS." California High Speed Rail Authority, 2005.
"Text of Proposed Law: Proposition 1A." California Secretary of State, 2008.
"Bay Area to Central Valley HSR Final Program EIR/EIS." California High Speed Rail Authority, 2012.
"Capitol Corridor, 2014 vision plan update final report." CCJPA, 2014.
"Our future is on track: Metrolink's 10-year strategic plan." Metrolink, 2015.
"California State Rail Plan." California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), 2018 (Draft).
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