California HSR should use Tejon Pass

The current California HSR plan has significant flaws; a major mistake was selecting a detour via Palmdale instead of the direct route via I-5 across Tejon pass to connect Bakersfield to Los Angeles. The cost of the Palmdale route -- about $32 billion in current dollars -- is more than twice that of the direct link, and nobody wants to pay for it. The HSR project will be restricted to the Central Valley until the less expensive Tejon route is embraced.

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Building an HSR spine for California

This post appears in the RailPAC Weekly E-Newsletter, July 30, 2012.

California can complete the North-South spine of its HSR project by 2030 without voter approval of further State bonds, but only if it completely revamps the system currently being pursued by the CHSR Authority. The Authority has chosen an extremely bad route, which is longer, slower, and vastly more expensive than the direct route via Tejon and Altamont passes.

Proceeding beyond the first segment from Madera to Bakersfield, the next step is to complete an initial operating segment (IOS) by building the second segment southward, from Bakersfield to Los Angeles via Tejon pass. The cost of this segment, based on the 2005 EIR, is around $10 billion in addition to the $6 billion being spent on the first segment. With 50% federal support, the State would have to draw an additional $5 billion from Prop 1A bonds. Ideally, the IOS should be extended to Anaheim as inexpensively as possible, using dedicated tracks in a rebuilt (and fully grade separated) Metrolink right of way.

Building the IOS would use up nearly all of the Prop 1A bonds, and other sources of support are needed to continue construction northward. Fortunately, the IOS (and successive extensions) are expected to generate significant net income from fares, sufficient to support well over $5 billion in revenue bonds. Together with federal grants, another $10 to $15 billion in additional construction is possible. This will cover the cost of the section from Madera to Oakland via Altamont pass, estimated to be $10 billion in the 2005 EIR. This will complete the spine of the HSR project, running from Oakland to Anaheim. The total cost is well under $30 billion (current dollars).

Once the spine is operational, branches to San Jose, Sacramento, and Riverside, and an extension to downtown San Francisco can be built when justified and financing is available. But it is premature to do detailed planning for these extensions, since their construction cannot possibly occur until after 2030. Furthermore, most of the extensions can be built at standards far below the 220 mph design speed for the spine, and may even involve track sharing with high performance local rail service.

Comparisons of proposed spine (including an extension to S.F.) with the CHSR Authority's current plan:

Distance (LA-SF): 420 miles vs. 450 miles
Run time (LA-SF): 2:17 vs. 2:38
Capital cost (LA-SF): $32 B vs. $62 B (!!!)

References:

Final Program EIR/EIS Report: Volume 3: Appendix 4-C, "Capital Cost: High Speed Train Alternative" (CHSR Authority, 2005)

Revised 2012 Business Plan Source Documents: "Cost Changes from 2009 Report to 2012 Business Plan" (CHSR Authority, 2012)

Comment by Noel Braymer, Newsletter editor:
I don't think that the current plan by the California High Speed Rail Authority is written in stone and I expect more changes will happen to it over the years. RailPAC's priority now is to push for a new rail connection between Palmdale and Bakersfield and get passenger rail service between Southern California, the San Joaquin Valley and the Bay Area in the next few years. It is unlikely that the Tejon Pass will be used for rail service in the near future. ACE is planning to expand service between Merced and San Jose in the next 5 years over the Altamont Pass to connect with the San Joaquins. Few details are available of what route or how frequent the service will be for the new Altamont pass ACE service.

Saturday, July 7, 2012

California HSR should use Tejon pass

Before the CA state senate vote on July 6th I thought that the federal stimulus grant for HSR would be better spent in the Los Angeles Basin, but after the vote I've changed my mind. It's better to have a somewhat over-built segment from Madera to Bakersfield that can run at speeds close to 200 mph than to have a segment centered on LAUS that may be limited to 150 mph or possibly only 125. This sort of practical limit on speeds in urban areas was acknowledged by the CHSR Authority in its recent business plan, which recommends operating high speed trains both in the L.A. Basin and in the Bay Area initially on the same tracks as conventional passenger trains ("blended" operations). The additional $1 billion-plus authorized by the state legislature for blended operations in L.A. will cover a large portion of the costs of this project, particularly if it is matched by local (Metrolink) money.

For this assignment of federal funds to the San Joaquin Valley to be effective, the Authority must adopt the Merced to San Fernando scenario for Phase 1 of HSR, giving priority to the Tehachapi crossing (per RailPAC's adopted position). But there is a serious flaw in Prop 1A, which mandates a detour through Palmdale and across Tehachapi pass. The cost of this alternative has now gone through the roof: about $16 billion for Bakersfield-Palmdale-San Fernando compared to a $7 billion estimate in the 2005 EIR! Presumably, the cost of the I-5 (Tejon pass) alternative has not seen so dramatic an escalation, but the Authority is apparently forbidden by Prop 1A to revisit this option. The legislature needs to clarify Prop 1A to allow Tejon pass to be considered as an alternative to the now prohibitively expensive Palmdale routing.

This small change to Prop 1A is absolutely essential in order to move forward with a relatively inexpensive Phase 1 using Prop 1A bonds. The cost of the I-5 alternative presented in the 2005 EIR was about $8 billion (current dollars), which is sufficiently small to legitimately ask for half-share federal funding in a single grant for a project of this importance. With improvements to the Metrolink/Surfliner corridor in the L.A. Basin, Phase 1 of HSR construction would effectively provide an initial operating segment for HSR from Merced to Anaheim, a distance of over 300 miles!

References:

Final Program EIR/EIS Report: Volume 3: Appendix 4-C, "Capital Cost: High Speed Train Alternative" (CHSR Authority, 2005).

Revised 2012 Business Plan Source Documents: "Cost Changes from 2009 Report to 2012 Business Plan" (CHSR Authority, 2012)

Monday, July 2, 2012

High Speed Rail should start in the L.A. Basin

Portions of this post appear in RailPAC Weekly E-Newsletter, July 9, 2012.

Most of the federal rail stimulus money awarded to California ($3.3 billion) should be shifted from the San Joaquin Valley to the urban areas -- chiefly the Los Angeles basin. NARP opposes this shift, calling construction of HSR in urban areas mere "enhancements of conventional infrastructure" (Hotline #765 -- June 29, 2012), but this position ignores the evolution of how to implement about HSR in California's urban areas. The original California proposal for federal funding included a request for a $2.2 billion grant for HSR between L.A. and Anaheim, matched by another $2.2 B of Prop. 1-A bonds. The CHSR Authority now plans to substantially upgrade existing urban rail corridors, so that (for example) high speed trains in the L.A. basin can share tracks with Pacific Surfliner and Metrolink services. The revised proposal would implement this "blended" system, at less than half the cost of full HSR. This plan would provide immediate benefits to the most important rail corridor in the U.S. outside the Northeast Corridor, and prepare the way for an HSR system operating across the Tehachapis to Bakersfield (preferably via Tejon pass).

The combination of a new rail crossing of the Tehachapis with rail improvements in the L.A. Basin is the single most important rail project in the entire U.S., generating more new intercity rail ridership than is current carried on the Northeast Corridor (about 15 million per year, compared to 12 million). The total cost of this projec, extending from Bakersfield to Anaheim (or Irvine), is around $15 billion, well within the funding capability of Prop. 1-A bonds together with matching federal grants. And it far outperforms any other option for HSR in California at a comparable cost. The bottom line is that the Tehachapi crossing is the single indispensable segment in a viable north-south rail line through the San Joaquin Valley, and details of extensions in the Vally should be deferred until the initial segment is in place. In the meantime, existing rail services at both ends of the HSR segment will serve as feeder lines with the possibility of offering run-through services such as Sacramento-San Diego.

One reason for initially limiting HSR in California to a relatively short system is that there are a large number of other rail projects that must also be carried forward, such as modernization of the Caltrain and ACE corridors in the north. Rail planners now think that "Super ACE" is the most important passenger rail project in the north, even if built to accommodate diesel operations at a maximum speed of 110 mph. Moreover, Super ACE can potentially provide San Joaquin service from San Francisco to Bakersfield at a run time of around 4 hours (average speed of 75 mph). But building HSR in northern California in advance of the Tehachapi crossing is almost a complete waste of money.

More broadly, the California HSR project as defined in Prop. 1-A is effectively a dead letter because of ballooning costs. The total cost for the entire 800-mile project now stands at some $150 billion and the $9 billion authorized by Prop. 1-A cannot realistically leverage more than a minimal initial segment. But the planning effort has been useful in some regards: we now have a more solid appreciation of the costs, ridership, and benefits of improved passenger rail in California, and the realization that it is impossible to effectively plan and finance this large of a project in the scattershot fashion allowed (and even encouraged) by mandates written into Prop. 1-A.

Building an anchor in the L.A. Basin is clearly the best place to start the California HSR system, since it provides immediate benefits (improved Pacific Surfliner and Metrolink services) that a stranded HSR line in the San Joaquin Valley cannot come close to matching. By starting in the L.A. Basin, the state can legitimately pursue federal funding for the Tehachapi crossing, using what is left of Prop. 1-A bonds for the local match. This is probably all California can afford to spend on HSR in the next 20 years, but coupled with greatly improved San Joaquin service (and possibly run-through trains to Los Angeles) it provides a clear goal that is much more likely to succeed than the dim prospects for the current, unfocused efforts.

Comment by Noel Braymer, Newsletter editor:
Since we can't take taxpayers money for granted we need to get as much out of what we get and serve as many people with it as possible. Each time we have a winner for rail service the more likely we will have support to build more improvements.