Re: "The Buzz" 12/15/09
Editor The Bee:
The cost of the California High Speed Rail project is far exceeds what was advertised a year ago when voters approved a $9.95 billion bond measure (Proposition 1A) to partially fund this ambitious project. The initial segment from San Francisco to Anaheim is estimated to cost over $42 billion, with no realistic funding plan or timeline. The legislature should suspend this project, and instead concentrate on improving and expanding existing passenger rail services.
There are a number of projects for improving local rail service in California that have much more urgency and higher payoff than the very expensive proposed HSR system. Improvements are needed to existing Amtrak California routes (Capitol Corridor, Pacific Surfliners and San Joaquins). Passenger rail service between the Bay Area and Los Angeles should be implemented by improving the coastal route, aiming for a travel time of less than seven hours as a midterm substitute for HSR service between these areas. All of these routes potentially support half-hourly service or better.
A major problem with the California HSR project is that it diverts financial support from these other, very important passenger rail projects, by concentrating resources on a pie-in-the-sky "Jetson" fantasy.
John Deeter, Sacramento
(Published 12/24/09)
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Clalif. High Speed Rail -- Notes
Summary
The primary purpose of the California High Speed Rail project is to provide rapid rail service linking Northern and Southern California at speeds up to 220 mph. Proposition 1A authorized $9 billion in state bonds (contingent on an equal match from other sources) to support this project, but this funding would only cover a portion of the full project (about $50 billion) or even for an initial route from San Francisco to Anaheim ($33 billion). There are now serious doubts that this massive project can be financed anytime soon, if ever (Dan Walters, Oct. 21 Sacramento Bee). Part of the growing cost can be traced to questionable assumptions underlying the chosen project, such as the need for the highest possible speed (220 mph) and access to downtown San Francisco via the Caltrain alignment and Pacheco Pass.
Further work on the current project should be suspended before a great deal of money is wasted on constructing isolated pieces that will never be connected into a state-wide system. A lower cost, bare-bones system should be considered, possibly running from L.A. Union Station to downtown Oakland, using Altamont pass instead of Pacheco pass to access the Central Valley from the Bay Area. This system would cost about $18 B -- close to currently authorized state funding with outside matches. Ridership and revenue would be nearly the same as the higher cost system running into downtown San Francisco, and either would have an operating ratio well below 50%.
An even less expensive system might also be considered, using conventional rail equipment running mostly within existing rail alignments, with major new construction only for the critical crossings of Soledad, Tehachapi, and Altamont passes. Expensive, nonessential features, such as complete segregation from freight operations, full grade separation, glitzy new stations, and service to downtown San Francisco would be deferred until a bare-bones initial system has proven its utility.
The alternative HSR system would utilize conventional trains powered by diesel-electric locomotives, running where possible on existing trackage at speeds up to 125 mph. Partial electrification across the Tehachapi mountains might be advisable to deal with grades up to 3.5%, but this would require modified (dual-power) locomotives to run as straight electrics under wire. A core alignment between Oakland and L.A. would require about 100 miles of new trackage: Sylmar to Palmdale (35 miles); Tehachapi pass (50 miles); and Altamont pass (about 15 miles, including a 5 mile tunnel). Cost of the new trackage would be about $6 billion, with another $3 to $4 billion required to reduce conflicts with freight trains and to eliminate some grade crossings. Average speed would be about 85 mph, giving a running time of slightly over 5 hours between Oakland and L.A. All major construction work would be designed to accommodate VHSR service (180 mph or more) at some time in the future. It is probably advantageous to continue operation on the initial system for at least ten years to fully evaluate the actual demand for HSR in the state.
Planning and construction of this minimum cost HSR system should take no more than 10 years, and produce a practical HSR system that California can be proud of for an affordable $10 billion.
Comparison of S.F./Pacheco and Oakland/Altamont alignments
* Underestimated by at least $2 B, including the cost of a S.F. station at the Trans-Bay Terminal.
** Can be added later.
Note: M = million, B = billion. See also Table S.5-1, in "Draft Bay Area to Central Valley High-Speed Train Program EIR/EIS", Summary section.
The primary purpose of the California High Speed Rail project is to provide rapid rail service linking Northern and Southern California at speeds up to 220 mph. Proposition 1A authorized $9 billion in state bonds (contingent on an equal match from other sources) to support this project, but this funding would only cover a portion of the full project (about $50 billion) or even for an initial route from San Francisco to Anaheim ($33 billion). There are now serious doubts that this massive project can be financed anytime soon, if ever (Dan Walters, Oct. 21 Sacramento Bee). Part of the growing cost can be traced to questionable assumptions underlying the chosen project, such as the need for the highest possible speed (220 mph) and access to downtown San Francisco via the Caltrain alignment and Pacheco Pass.
Further work on the current project should be suspended before a great deal of money is wasted on constructing isolated pieces that will never be connected into a state-wide system. A lower cost, bare-bones system should be considered, possibly running from L.A. Union Station to downtown Oakland, using Altamont pass instead of Pacheco pass to access the Central Valley from the Bay Area. This system would cost about $18 B -- close to currently authorized state funding with outside matches. Ridership and revenue would be nearly the same as the higher cost system running into downtown San Francisco, and either would have an operating ratio well below 50%.
An even less expensive system might also be considered, using conventional rail equipment running mostly within existing rail alignments, with major new construction only for the critical crossings of Soledad, Tehachapi, and Altamont passes. Expensive, nonessential features, such as complete segregation from freight operations, full grade separation, glitzy new stations, and service to downtown San Francisco would be deferred until a bare-bones initial system has proven its utility.
The alternative HSR system would utilize conventional trains powered by diesel-electric locomotives, running where possible on existing trackage at speeds up to 125 mph. Partial electrification across the Tehachapi mountains might be advisable to deal with grades up to 3.5%, but this would require modified (dual-power) locomotives to run as straight electrics under wire. A core alignment between Oakland and L.A. would require about 100 miles of new trackage: Sylmar to Palmdale (35 miles); Tehachapi pass (50 miles); and Altamont pass (about 15 miles, including a 5 mile tunnel). Cost of the new trackage would be about $6 billion, with another $3 to $4 billion required to reduce conflicts with freight trains and to eliminate some grade crossings. Average speed would be about 85 mph, giving a running time of slightly over 5 hours between Oakland and L.A. All major construction work would be designed to accommodate VHSR service (180 mph or more) at some time in the future. It is probably advantageous to continue operation on the initial system for at least ten years to fully evaluate the actual demand for HSR in the state.
Planning and construction of this minimum cost HSR system should take no more than 10 years, and produce a practical HSR system that California can be proud of for an affordable $10 billion.
Comparison of S.F./Pacheco and Oakland/Altamont alignments
| S.F. via Pacheco | Oakland via Altamont | |
| System ridership (annual) | 93.3 M | 94.4 M |
| Time to L.A. | 2:38 | 2:23 |
| Distance to L.A. | 455 miles | 420 miles |
| Capital cost to Madera (est.) | $9.1 B* | $7.2 B |
| Capital cost to L.A. (est.) | $21.7 B* | $19.8 B |
| Capital cost to Anaheim (est.) | $25.7 B* | $23.8 B |
| Number of stations north of Fresno | 5 | 7 |
| Service to northern San Joaquin valley | no** | yes |
| Service to downtown S.F. | yes | yes, via BART |
| Service to San Jose | yes | no** |
| International airports served | 1 | 1 |
* Underestimated by at least $2 B, including the cost of a S.F. station at the Trans-Bay Terminal.
** Can be added later.
Note: M = million, B = billion. See also Table S.5-1, in "Draft Bay Area to Central Valley High-Speed Train Program EIR/EIS", Summary section.
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